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Real Options Theory for Law Makers
Bruno De¤ainsyand Marie Obidzinskiz
Abstract
The formulation of legal rules is a challenging issue for lawmakers. Trade-o¤s are
inevitable between providing more guidance by specic rules and enlarging the scope
by general rules. Using real options theory we show that the degree of precision should
be considered as a degree of exibility which increases the value of the text. Thus, we
derive a normative principle for a draftsman to choose between rules versus standards
and to decide when the law should be enacted. In highly innovating environments,
delaying the enactment allows lawmakers to obtain more information. Therefore, the
lower the degree of precision of the law, the shorter the delay.
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Ceux qui ont un génie assez étendu pour pouvoir donner des lois à leur
nation ou à une autre doivent faire de certaines attentions sur la manière de
les former Montesquieu, 1748, De lEsprit des Lois, Livre XXIX, Chapitre
XVI
1 Introduction
The design of legal rules is a challenging issue for legislators. The prime aim of these rules
is to capture the objective of underlying policies. However, lawmakers are unable to foresee
all contingencies and citizens might be misguided by ambiguous rules. As expressed by
Landes and Posner (1975:879):
the limits of human foresight, the ambiguities of language, and the high cost of
legislative deliberation combine to assure that most legislation will be enacted
in a seriously incomplete form, with many uncertainty left to be resolved by
the courts.
Naturally, these di¢ culties grow with social and technological changes that generate
new uncertainties.
This paper aims to determine how much uncertainty should be left to courts. Law-
makers decide this by choosing the following characteristics of legal rules (Kaplow, 1992,
1999): the degree of precision and whether the content of law should be given at the time
of enactment (rule) or by the judge (standard). A trade-o¤ is inevitable between provid-
ing more guidance by specic rules and enlarging the scope by general rules. This choice
depends on the variability of contingencies and on the degree of innovation in the area of
the law. The latter relates to the process of obsolescence: times goes by and the rule that
was designed for its context at the time of enactment does no longer t reality. In other
words, these characteristics are chosen according to how much information the lawmaker
believes he receives.
Variable contingencies tip the scale towards more exible rules. Lowering specicity
in order to increase exibility bears a cost: benets in terms of guidance diminish, and
uncertainty as regards interpretation rises. Regulation versus ex post liability is a classical
example where the variability of circumstances inuences the choice between rules and
standards. Regulation guides rms to stick to a uniform standard of care while ex post
liability gives the judge the possibility to dene the optimal standard of care as a function
of each particular case.
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Hart (1994:130) highlights this issue:
In fact all systems, in di¤erent ways, compromise between two social needs:
the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be
applied by private individuals to themselves without fresh o¢ cial guidance or
weighing up of social issues, and the need to leave open, for latter settlement
by an informed, o¢ cial choice, issues which can only be properly appreciated
and settled when they arise in a concrete case.
A typical example of obsolescence is the creation of the rule on disclosure of information
in the nancial sector as described by Pistor and Xu (2002a, 2002b, 2003). The underlying
policy objective is that rms that trade on the stock exchange should disclose all relevant
information to shareholders in order to ensure an e¢ cient functioning of the market.
However complex nancial products evolve so rapidly that it is not possible to specify all
possibilities in statutory law. Consequently, the lawmaker has to compromise between the
guidance benets of precise rules and a lower depreciation rate of general standards. The
sensitivity to obsolescence decreases with the spectrumof the legal rule. Many other
examples can be found in new areas of law, such as genetics, biotechnologies, the internet
or music piracy. Law must t reality, that is it must adapt itself to the uncertain evolution
of its environment.
This paper studies how to deal with varying contingencies and obsolescence by using
real options theory. In theoretical terms, lawmakers have di¤erent options1. They can
increase the degree of exibility of a rule. They can also delay promulgation. Finally, they
can choose an optimal mix between a delay and the precision of the rule.
The law and economics literature focuses on the relative costs and benets of rules
versus standards. Ehrlich and Posner (1974) develop a static analysis on the precision
of legal rules. Precise rules are said to guide courts and the behavior of parties more
e¢ ciently before and during the trial, providing them with more complete information.
This e¤ect is included by Landes and Posner (1976) in an analysis of the creation of
precedents as an investment decision. The set of legal precedents is treated as a stock of
information2 that depreciates when unforeseen contingencies arise. The existence of an
optimal stock of legal capital is proven. It is derived from the maximization of the net
present value (NPV) of the informational services minus the cost of investment. Future
1From this perspective, it is important to note that the paper does not distinguish between primary
and secondary lawmaking, i.e. between legislation and regulation.
2On the informational value of legal rules, see also Diver (1983), Kaplow (1992, 1995, 1999), Mahoney
and Sanchirico (2004).
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benets are implicitly supposed to be certain and general legal capital is assumed to have
a lower depreciation rate than specic legal capital3. An empirical analysis on citations of
laws during litigation shows that general rules tend to depreciate more slowly. Therefore,
the greatest benet of standards can only be perceived by introducing a time dimension:
its adaptability to a large set of circumstances. Ehrlich and Posner (1974) further observe
that a standard enables the legal outcome to change over time when the economic and
technological environment changes. The counterpart of these advantages is that precision
is costly because courts have to collect a lot of information before formulating and applying
rules.
To assess the value of law, one limit of the NPV criterion used by Landes and Posner
(1976) is that it does not permit to take into account the uncertainty which characterizes
the evolution of the value of the contents of a legal statement. A content is dened
here as an interpretation, a meaning of the statement (Kaplow, 1992). A standard such
as adopting "reasonable care" has multiple contents determined by ex post contingencies,
while a rule generally has only one. The value of a content varies with the disparities of
situations.
Very recently, the method of pricing legal options has been applied to legal frameworks
(Ayres, 2005, Bar-Gill, 2005, Grundfest and Huang, 2004) in order to capture uncertainty
from the agentspoint of view (litigants, potential o¤enders). Parisi, Fon and Ghei (2004)
took the point of view of lawmakers and proposed a model of investment under uncertainty
applied to the timing of the decision to invest in law. They show that there is a value to
waiting in lawmaking.
However, the question of exibility on the choice of the ex post legal content has not
been analyzed using the real options framework. The specicity of our approach lies in the
use of real options to analyze the characteristics of legal rules. In a rst step we evaluate
exibility regarding the ex post choice of content, and a decision making rule is derived
to choose between a rule as opposed to a standard. In a second step, the exibility of the
timing of enacting the rule is evaluated and a decision rule for the lawmaker to choose
when to enact a law is derived as a function its degree of precision. This framework helps
to understand how legal systems cope with the incompleteness of law. In doing so, it sheds
a di¤erent light on the debate about the characteristics of legal rules by using real option
theory.
The paper is structured as follows. Section (2) justies the interpretation of legal rules
as real options. Section (3) evaluates the exibility of standards. Section (4) shows that
3See also Posner (1999), for a analysis of legal rules from an evolutionary perspective.
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the sensitivity of legal rules to obsolescence a¤ects the value of waiting in lawmaking.
2 Legal rules as real options
How should a producer of law evaluate legal rules? What characteristics should be chosen
in an evolving environment? An original way to analyze these choices is to consider legal
rules as real options. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) notice that real option theory can be
applied to many non-economic issues and particularly to legal reforms4. In this section,
the real option framework is briey reviewed and the relevance of its application to the
issue of obsolescence in lawmaking is discussed.
2.1 Dynamics of the real options approach
After the simultaneous success of Merton (1973) and Black and Scholes (1973) in the
early seventies, real option theory marked a great progress in the domain of investment
decisions in corporate nance. Under this approach, the value of a rm or a project
is not only the sum of the value of the current assets but also the value of the future
opportunities to invest. Furthermore, while the classical NPV criterion implicitly assumes
that the future value of the investment is known, option theory introduces the cost of
uncertainty in the evaluation of projects. Uncertainty is formalized by the assumption
that the underlying asset price follows a stochastic process. Indeed, the price of each of
these underlying opportunities, such as the price of commodities or the demand level on
a particular market, varies stochastically and is consequently impossible to forecast.
In order to apply real options theory, an investment project has to be characterized by
the uncertainty on its future cash-ows, the irreversibility of its investments, and exibility
of the project. The latter refers to the ability to take advantage of favorable circumstances
and to avoid unfavorable ones. The existence of an option value depends on exibility.
Many forms of exibility exist and thus many types of real options have to be considered.
Flexibility may lie in the possibility to delay the investment. Flexibility can also bear on
the ex post choice of the type of output.
4See Pindyck and Dixit (1994), p. 23-25. They particularly focus on the value of waiting in lawmaking:
Given some legislative and administrative costs of changing laws, our theory suggests that the option to
wait and see if the trend of opinion will reverse itself has some value.
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2.2 Legal options and lawmaking
As an investor, the lawmaker5 compares the relative costs and benets of the di¤erent
formulations of legal rules. The costs and benets of rules compared to standards depends
on the variability of contingencies and on the degree of innovation in the environment.
Indeed, legal rules provide a ow of services, such as informational benets about the way
to behave in human interactions6. From a static point of view, the law and economics
literature emphasizes the fact that specic rules do better than general rules but that they
are more costly to create. Posner (1992) remarks that precise rules reduce information
costs of litigants and adjudicators during the trial. When matters are less clear and more
di¢ cult to predict, partiesexpectations of the outcome of the adjudication are more likely
to diverge. As a result, parties to a dispute will tend to settle less often and the litigation
rate increases7. On the contrary, precise law provide more guidanceand consequently
increases the deterrent or preventive e¤ects of legal rules. To sum up, when we consider
the optimal design of rules, the ow of benets from law comes from the ability to guide
behavior and to avoid costs. Thus, the value of law is directly linked with its informational
contents. The more precise the information is, the more parties and judges are informed
before and during litigation, and the lower is the cost incurred by adjudicators.
Ehrlich and Posner (1974) analyze the relation between precision and e¢ ciency of the
legal process, showing that the degree of precision of a legal rule is the main determi-
nant of the reduction of lawsuit costs, as it allows better guidance provided to courts.
They recognize the importance of information costs, especially when the legal command
potentially covers many di¤erent behaviors.
Obviously, this result may no longer be valid when a time dimension is added8. More
precisely, facing signicant changes in a given area, the law may not t reality any longer.
In such a case, the value of legal rules is reduced, since the ow of its services stops.
Limits to human capacity and the ambiguity of terms prevent producers of rules from
accurately and exhaustively listing all possible contingencies under which a rule is to be
5We assume that the lawmaker is a risk neutral benevolent investor. However, we are aware of the
interest-group perspective that analyzes the inuence of lobbies on the political process. In particular,
precise legislation may reect lobbies preferences and limit the discretionary power of judges. See for
example Stigler (1971), Landes and Posner (1975) and Mahoney and Sanchirico (2005).
6 It is quite natural in the eld of economics of contracts to consider that courts and legal systems
contribute to solving moral hazard and adverse selection problems (see for instance Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy, 1999 and the literature therein).
7See also Cooter et Rubinfeld (1989) on litigation versus settlement in a di¤ering perception model,
Johnston (1991, 1995) on bargaining under rules versus standard, and Spier (1994) on the impact of the
design of damage awards in litigation versus settlements and on the ex ante level of care in an assymetric
information model.
8Ehrlich and Posner (1974) remark that we have largely ignored the cost and benets associated with
the time dimension of legal regulationp. 278.
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activated. This kind of incompleteness is recognized as an issue that the creator of law
has to deal with: it leads to deterrence problems which may only be taken into account
in a dynamic perspective and not in a static one. However, according to their degree of
precision, legal rules have di¤erent sensitivities to obsolescence. According to Ehrlich and
Posner (1974), obsolescence is not a serious problem with regulation by standardsand
that the more detailed a rule is, the more often it will have to be changed9. In other
words, a limit to obsolescence consists in choosing ambiguous terms. However, ambiguity
implies divergent interpretations, and thus contributes to the incompleteness of law. What
is important to note is that while both legal gaps and ambiguity dene incompleteness of
law (Bowers, 2000, Pistor and Xu, 2003), ambiguity is included intentionally in the law.
Indeed, ambiguous terms present some benets that are highlighted in the real options
approach described in the next section.
Moreover, the costs of enacting a precise law are higher than the enactment costs
generated by a general law. Indeed, legislators have to nd an agreement on more points
(Posner, 1992). Following Kaplow (1992, 1999), informational costs are incurred ex ante
by the producer of law in the case of rules while they are incurred ex post by the adjudicator
in the case of standards.
When considering legal rules as real investments, two types of options have to be
considered. First, while a rule may be compared to a bright line test completely cut o¤
from any circumstantial factor, a standard allows the judge to choose the most relevant
interpretation among many other. This exibility, arising from the additional possibility
of choosing, not only to apply one particular content but to apply the most valuable
content, can be evaluate by using a particular type of option; "an option on the maximum
on multiple risky asset". This idea underlying this option is very intuitive. For example,
imagine that a eld is bought in t0 and that the investor has to choose in t1 to build di¤erent
types of productive units. The one with the highest value will be chosen in t1, knowing
that their respective values evolve stochastically. The option formula, developped by
Stulz (1982) for two assets and by Johnson (1987) on several assets evaluate the exibility
arising from this ex post choice. This idea is easily transposable to law. Imagine a legal
statement using ambiguous terms such as a driver should not impose an unreasonable risk
to pedestrians. This terminology allows many interpretations according to circumstances.
The judge may punish a driver on the basis of the speed, on the basis of level of alcohol in
the blood or regarding more general care such as using a mobile phone. On the contrary, a
rule allow the judge to sanction only on the basis of one of these content, such as a speed
9 Id. est.
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limit10 as its content is given ex ante. Consider a tra¢ c law putting the speed limit at
130km/hour on motorways. The judge applies it if the driver exceeds the speed limit. In
terms of option, this refers to a simple call option11: the option is exercised at the time of
the judgement only if the value of the underlying asset exceeds the cost to exercise it (the
adjudication cost) which is equivalent to say that the law is not applied if not relevant.
Second, exibility on the timing of the enactment is also valuable. The lawmaker has
the ability to choose to wait before creating law in order to collect more information.
However, the waiting depend on the degree of precision of rules.
3 The trade-o¤ between guidance and exibility
The choice between rules and standards is a familiar one to lawyers. The question generally
involves a tradeo¤ between: (a) Invest more at T0, create a specic rule, and then invest
at T1, T2,. . . to update the rule or su¤er the cost of obsolescence and (b) Invest less at
T0, create a exible standard, and then invest at T1, T2,. . . to apply the standard.
In practice, legal norms can dictate particular outcomes or set forth more open-ended
tests, whose application is left to the discretion of judges. For instance, speed limit may
take the form of a rule requiring drivers to go no more than 130 kilometers per hour, or a
standard requiring them to travel at a safe speed. On one side, we want laws to be clear
so that agents exactly know what behavior is expected (guidance). This argues in favor of
a rule. Considering the case of copyright law, we want to know who owns what, for how
long, how far the copyright owners rights reach, which unauthorized uses are excused or
authorized. On the other side, we want judicial decisions to be adapted to facts, what
pleads in favor of a standard.
We propose to explain how options theory could help to solve this trade-o¤. Using a
numerical example, we propose to evaluate the exibility of legal rules via options theory
and to derive a decision rule.
3.1 Valuation of legal exibility
The uctuations of a legal content value are assumed to be uncertain because new infor-
mations arise as time goes. Appeals to pharmaceutical or medical liability rules is a¤ected
by the state of the art concerning risks management. The necessity of bankruptcy law is
dependant of the macroeconomic growth. The use of labor law is certainly inuenced by
10We are aware that this example is very simplied. The aim is to highlight the exibility to choose
among multiple content rather than among a more limited number of interpretation.
11Callas the adjudicator has to estimate the cost to have the possibility to apply the law.
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the unemployement rate. Therefore, the value of the legal contents generally grows over
time with the growth of the economy, however in an uncertain way. To capture this idea,
we consider that the value S of a legal rule follows a standard Brownian motion12. An
increase dS during the interval of time dt is characterized by:
dS = Sdt+ Sdz
where S and S are two constant terms. The increment dz follows a Wiener process, that
is dz = "
p
dt, with "  N(0; 1). The standard deviation S characterizes the volatility of
S, i.e. the variability of contingencies. The constant term S is the drift, that is the part
of the change dS which is predictable.
The possibility to apply a legal rule can be evaluated by a European call option13. The
Black and Scholes formula for this option is:
C(Si;K; T ) = SiN(d1) Ke rTN(d2) (1)
with
d1 =
log[SiK ] + (r +
i
2
2 )T
i
p
T
(2)
d2 = d1 i
p
T =
log[SiK ] + (r +
i
2
2 )T
i
p
T
(3)
K is the strike price of the call option14, that is the cost of the judges decision (or the
cost to enforce a legal rule) and T the time of the judgement, and Si the initial value of
the content i. We assume that S equals r; the risk free rate. The lawmaker is assumed
to be risk neutral. Therefore, optimal allocation of lawmaking resources requires that 
equals the risk free r. N(x) is the cumulative function of a variable x which follows a
standardized normal distribution N(0; 1).
To illustrate, we consider that at date 0 the content of law is estimated via the value
of conicts solved by the intervention of the judicial system (including agreements in the
shadow of the law). Suppose that S = 40 millions euros. The cost to apply the law K;
that is the cost of legal inputs, is also set equal to 40 millions euros. Consider now that
at date T = 10; the court will apply the rule if the content value S10 is higher than K.
12This type of Brownian motion is generally used to characterized the uctuations of raw materials
prices. Black and Scholes formulas applied below are based on this hypothesis.
13This type of option is called "European" as the time T to strike the option is xed, while the date to
strike "American" options is not specied in advance.
14For simplicity, we assume here that the cost of the judgedecision is the same with a standard and
with a rule. In reality, the cost incurred by the judge in interpreting a fuzzy standard rather than applying
a simple rule might be more important.
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The volatility of the content value is suposed equal to 0:3, and the risk free rate to 0:1.
The parameters values capture the quite reasonable idea that the benets of the rule are
signicantly positive and that the interest rate is small.
Under these hypothesis, the legal value of the rule is given by15:
C(40; 40; 10) = 26:89
The possibility to apply the rule at date T is valued at 26:89 millions euros. To give
an economic interpretation to this value, we need to compare with the one obtained for a
standard using the same numerical values.
To simplify calculations, assume that there are only two possible interpretations of a
standard (i.e. two contents A and B)16. Under a standard, the judge has to choose the
maximum between SA, SB and 0 at the date of the judgement. Assume that the ex ante
value S of two contents is the same: SA = SB. The value of the call on the maximum of
SA and SB can be calculated using the following formula17:
MX(SA; SB;K; t) = C(SA;K; t) + C(SB;K; t) M(SA; SB;K; t)
with C(SA;K; t) and C(SB;K; t) corresponding to the ordinary calls on SA or SB and
M(SA; SB;K; t) to the option on the minimum between SA and SB.
The calculation of MX implies to appreciate the degree of correlation between the
two contents SA;SB . Positive correlation seems justied by the fact that the two possible
interpretations are generally linked. For example, regarding the legal statement on the
unreasonable risk, at least two contents do not drink alcohol and do not exceed 90
kilometers per hourcan be found. These two contents are linked if alcohol is associated
with high speed. Following, we suppose that the degree of correlation is set at 0:5.
Call options on the maximum of two risky assets have to be evaluated in two steps.
First, the value of a european option on the minimum of two assets M(SA; SB;K; t) is
calculated. Then, the value on the maximum MX(SA; SB;K; t) is deduced. For the
15By substitution, we nd (2) and (3):
d1 = 1:52
d2 = 0:57
We can use a polynomial approximation to calculate N(d) and get: N(d1) = 0:93 and N(d2) = 0:71.
16For simplicity reason, we calculate the option for two possible assets. The results are transposable to
multiple assets options, as the increase of the number of asset increase the value of the option.
17See Stulz (1982)
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parameters values given above, we found that :
M(SA; SB;K; t) ' 12:87
See Appendix 6.1 
The possibility to apply the content of the rule which have the minimum value (the
interpretation of the rule which ts the less to the case) at date t is valued at 12:87 millions
euros. The intuition is the straightforward : the possibility to apply the standard is better
than nothing.
As the initial values of both contents are equal, we get C(SA;K; t) = C(SB;K; t) and
the value of the call on the maximum of SA and SB approximately amounts to:
MX(SA; SB;K; t) ' 40:91
The comparison between the ordinary option Ci and the option on the maximum
MX shows that the value of law increases with the number of possible ex post contents:
a standard has a higher value than a single rule18. The di¤erence between MX and C
represents the value of exibility induced by the choice between two contents and not only
one.
This approach contributes to justify the choice of general standard like the reasonable
man and bonus pater familias in liability law or bona de in contract law. These standard
have so many legal interpretations that the call on the maximum is very high.
Naturally, the scope of a standard consists in the number n of contents Si=1;::;n and
in the strength of their links, that is the degree of correlation. The lower the correlation
between contents, the larger the scope of a standard. For a correlation S1;S2 reduced to
0:25, the option on the maximum of S1 and S2 approximately amounts to:
MX(S1; S2;K; t) = 44:49
This establihes the relevance of the scope of a standard. The larger the scope, the
higher the standard value.
This rst step in the analysis of legal rules in the real options framework emphasizes
the value of exibility compared to the rulesrigidity in an uncertain environment. The
value of exibility should be taken into account by lawmakers when dealing with changing
18Obsviously, a lawmaker should compare the value of many rules with a standard. However, a lawmaker
may not be able to foresee every contingencies (and be aware that there exist unforeseeen contigencies)
or it may be too costly to write a rule for each one. In this case, the comparison of a single rule with a
standard is relevant.
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and complex areas of law. Such result does not question the benets of precision in terms
of guidance, but highlights the adaptability of general standards. Indeed, standards
allow judges to adapt legal rules to circumstances and to manage the obsolescence of law.
If changes arise and the value of a specic content is strongly reduced, the judge still have
in hands opportunities to adapt contents19.
3.2 The lawmaker decision rule
In a second step, we propose a formalization of the trade-o¤ between rules and standards
by taking into account a major benet of rule in term of guidance. In our approach,
more exibility is provided at the cost of less informational value. The di¤erence between
MX and C captures the value of exibility. Let  captures the lower ex ante informational
benets brought by standards compared to those brought by rules, as discussed in section
(2).  varies between 0 and 1, such that  2 (0; 1)20. When  is closed to zero, the ex ante
informational benets of a standard are very low. On the contrary,  close to the unity
characterized a legal statement which brings many information how to behave, and thus
very much certainty.
To make easier the comparison, we assume that the initial value of both statements
are the same: S1 = S2. So, we have: C(S1;K; t) = C(S2;K; t) = C(Si;K; t). Thereby, a
legislator should favor a standard rather than a rule if MX(S1; S2;K; t) > C(Si;K; t),
with i = 1; 2. The following proposition is derived:
Proposition : There exists a threshold value  2 [12 ; 1), above which the lawmaker
should enforce a standard rather than a rule. Everything else remaining equal, the threshold
value  equals C(Si;K;t)MX(S1;S2;K;t) .
Proof: see Appendix 6.2 
This proposition can be interpreted as a decision rule for lawmakers. In order to choose
between a standard or a rule, the lawmaker has to compare the exibility and the guidance
values. The lower C(Si;K;t)MX(S1;S2;K;t) , the higher the value of exibility. If the informational
benets of a standard are too low ( < 12), a rule is always preferred. The society valuation
of guidance () depends on the agentsdegree of risk aversion. They may prefer the rule
has with certainty a meaning S1 rather than an ex post interpretation S1 or S2, at the cost
of more rigidity. The higher the degree, the higher the valuation of law guidance. If 12 < ,
19Although light carts have disappeared, a statement requiring a driver to adopt "a reasonable speed" is
still adapted for motor vehicle, while a statement setting a particular speed would have become obsolete.
This issue of obsolescence is further developed in section (4).
20The value of the informational benets brought by the agent is never as high as the value of the
informational benets brought by a rule.
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the lawmaker has to balance the relative advantage of both type of legal statements. If
 < C(Si;K;t)MX(S1;S2;K;t) , a rule is preferred to a standard. On the contrary, if  >
C(Si;K;t)
MX(S1;S2;K;t)
,
the value to exibility of a standard is su¢ ciently high to tip the balance in favor of the
standard.
For instance, considering the case of patent or copyright laws, one can consider that
the informational benets of a standard are too low ( < 12), so that a precise rule is
needed. A possible explanation is that the benets of a general standard of fairness are
small in a context of fast innovation where rms need before all precise informations about
the extent of the protection they will obtain for a certain period.
However, until now, we assert that precise rules have a higher informational value than
standards. However, precise rules are also more sensitive than standards to innovation.
This is due to their lack of exibility. Therefore, a benevolent lawmaker has to take into
account the risk of obsolescence in the evaluation of the rule. In a highly innovating context,
the producer of law may decide to wait before investing in law in order to obtain more
information or to invest in a large scope standard. The e¤ect of such characteristics on
the choice to invest in law or wait in order to get more information is developed in the
following section.
4 Enactment timing and legal precision
In the preceding analysis, we have considered legal rules as European options: the time to
exercise the option is xed in advance. However, the lawmaker may decide to wait before
creating the law in order to get more information about the area. In this case, the option
is called American: The time t of exercising Americanoptions is not xed (t  T ).
Applying a model of investment under uncertainty in continuous time21, it is possible to
show that there is a value of waiting in lawmaking (Parisi and al., 2004).
In the analysis below, we consider that legal systems are subject to obsolescence in-
herent to social and/or technological evolution22. Jones and Ostroy (1984) show that the
value of exibility depends on the amount of information the decision maker expects to
acquire. They discuss the notion of beliefs and propose the following behavioral principle:
the more variable are the decision makers beliefs, the more exible is the position he
will choose... current doubts may be partially resolved in the near future. This prospect
decrease the attractiveness of the long-term commitment, in that one is able to respond less
21This type of model was rst developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986)
22 In the model, innovation is assumed to be exogeneous and not an output of an active research by
agents looking for news technologies that enable them to avoid the law (Malik, 1990).
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fully to new information. We can observe the same situation in the legal environment.
The lawmaker has generally two possible stratgies: to wait until he obtains enoughin-
formation to enact a precise rule (that is, the value of the legal content is su¢ cient) or
to adopt a more general rule.
4.1 Variation of legal content value under obsolescence
To capture the idea that obsolescence may happen at a time non determinable previously,
it seems more accurate to use a Poisson process (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, and Piatecki,
2004)23. Thus, we assume that S follows a mixed Brownian motion jump process such as:
dS = Sdt+ Sdz   SdN (4)
where dN is the increment of a Poisson process. There is a probability  that an event
occurs in the interval dt.
Pr(dN = 1) = dt
Pr(dN = 0) = 1  dt
If an event occurs, the value S of the legal content drop by a xed percentage  during
the period dt,with 0    1. If dN(t) = dt, the value of the benets decrease from 
times its initial value. We nd:
dS = (  )Sdt+ Sdz
If  = 1, the legal rule creates some benets and loses them immediately, and then
creates no more benets:
dS = Sdt+ Sdz   Sdt (5)
The mixed Brownian jump process describes situations where a loophole is found in
law and every potential o¤ender circumvents the law. A good illustration refers to the
evolution of environmental liability when rms adopt strategies to escape the payment of
damages in case of judgement proof (LoPucki, 1996).
The mixed Brownian motion jump process is partially predictable as the expected rate
of change E(dN) is di¤erent from zero, with E(dN) = dt and V (dN) = dt. The
expected change of S is not  but instead E(dS) = ( ), as on each interval dt, there
23The representation of the evolution of benets with a Brownian motion necessarily implies that the
legal rule exists and yields benets for ever. Consequently, the formalization of the evolution of the benets
S as a Brownian motion is not suitable with the possibility of obsolescence.
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is a probability dt that V will fall by 100 percent24.
As N(t) follows a Poisson distribution, the probability of an event to happen during
one period dt is independent from the probability of an event happening in any other
period. Furthermore, dz and dN are independent, that is E(dzdN) = 0.
4.2 Enactment timing
The risk-neutral lawmaker decides at each period dt whether to exercise the option, that
is to promulgate the rule, or to continue waiting. The decision to invest resources in law
can be made at any period and can be indenitely postponed. The lawmaker chooses the
maximum between the net benets S(t)  I and the present expected value of the option
1=(1 + r)E[F (S; t + dt)], that is between the left part and the right part of the Bellman
equation (6).
F (S) = maxfS(t)  I; E[F (S; t+ dt)]
1 + r
g (6)
where I is the sunk cost to implement the rule25 and r the risk free interest rate.
If there exists no such thing as obsolescence we have: r = + , with  the short term
benets.  have to be included as it is the short term benet of the rule, that is what
benet the rule would brought if it was enacted at time t. Indeed, as any asset, a rule
has a return in the current period. However, if there exists even a slight probability  of
obsolescence we have: r = +    .
The lawmaker can invest in two ways: a specic rule or a general rule. When decided,
the enactment is immediate for both types of rules. Following Ehrlich and Posner (1974)26,
we assume that sensitivity to obsolescence is higher for precise rules than for general rules,
that is:
S  R
with  the probability that an event occurs in the interval dt which imply obsolescence,
that is which decreases the value of the precise rule R or the general general rule S by
the same xed percentage . In order to characterize obsolescence which would imply to
change the rule, as said by Ehrlich and Posner (1974),  is assumed to be equal to one.
Furthermore, informational benets  +  are higher for precise rules rather than for
24Of course, one can imagine intermediate situation where the obsolescence is not so radical but, our
aim is to consider the kind of tradeo¤s that the rulemakers have to solve.
25We assume that I is equal for a particular law at all times. This hypothesis is realistic if we consider that
the decision to invest in law should not last too long so as to modify both institutional and informational
costs.
26See Section 2:2 for a longer discussion.
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general rules as illustrated in section 2:2 : S+S < R+R; with S and S the long term
and short term benets of a standard and R and R the long term and short term benets
of a rule. To understand this, make the purely theoretical assumption that both type of
law, which regulate the same area, have "initially" the same value. A small variation dt
increase more the value of the precise rule than the standard as S < R: Why is that?
This is due to the fact that a precise rule provides more information than a standard, as
discussed in section 2:2: For example, precises statements in driving regulation give more
information on how to behave and make coordination easier than a standard which would
state that "all motorist should drive carefully".
These informational benets should compensate the expected loss due sensitivity to
obsolescence . Indeed, the risk free rate r has to remain constant, as shown by Merton
(1976). Indeed, no producer of law would choose a precise rule if the negative risk e¤ect
is not counterbalanced by higher benets: r = S + S   S and r = R + R   R.
By dynamic programming, we obtain for  = 1:
F (S) = AS1
with
1 =
1
2
  (r +   )
2
+
r
(
r +   
2
  1
2
)2 + 2
(r + )
2
and with A a constant term equals to:
A =
S   I
(S)1
=
(1   1)1 1
(1)
1I1
The optimal value S is dened by:
S =
1
1   1
I
See Appendix 6.3 
We observe that S > I, as 1 > 0. The simple use of the NPV criteria is not su¢ cient:
the threshold above which the legal content value is high enough to enact the rule is higher
than the cost to promulgate it.
Using numerical values, table 2 illustrates how 1, S
 and A vary with  and shows
that the net e¤ect of  over the critical value S is positive27.
27The opportunity cost of investing immediately rather than waiting increases with the risk of obsoles-
cence if the e¤ect on the expected gain is neutralized by the increase in the rate of growth of benets so
as to keep constant the interest rate r.
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 1 S
 A
0 2:000 2:000 0:250
0:01 1:850 2:175 0:279
0:02 1:732 2:366 0:307
0:1 1:317 4:158 0:487
0:3 1:124 9:062 0:677
0:5 1:077 14:038 0:758
0:7 1:055 19:027 0:805
1 1:039 26:519 0:846
Table 1 Values of 1, S and A when  varies and r =  = 0; 04 ,  = 1, I = 1 and
 = 0; 2:
Figure 3 plots the waiting option value F (S) as a function of the legal content value S.
Suppose that r =  = 0:04 ,  = 1, I = 1,  = 0:2. For a probability of obsolescence given
as  = 0:01 for the standard, the coe¢ cient 1 amounts to 1:850 and the constant term A
to 0:279. Equivalently, for  = 0:1 in the case of the rule, coe¢ cients respectively are 1:317
and 0:487. Thus, the functions F (S) = AS1 can be represented for a general rule and
for a precise one. The upper curve refers to the precise rule option value. Promulgation
costs I are assumed to be equals for a rule and a standard. Consequently, a unique S   I
straight line is plot and tangency points with F (S)jS and F (S)jR gives threshold values
SS and S

R.
F(S)
S*S S*R
0
I S
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Figure 3: Threshold values for a standard SS ( = 0:01) and a rule S

R ( = 0:1), with
r =  = 0:04, K = 1,  = 0:2
The gure should be interpret as the following. Each curve is not valid after the relevant
threshold. On ]0; SS [ it is optimal to wait before investing in a standard as F (S)S > S I.
At SS , the lawmaker is indi¤erent between waiting and enacting a standard immediately.
On ]SS ;1[, it is optimal to enact a standard immediately. The same reasoning applies
for SR.
Therefore, the optimal decision rule for a lawmaker is di¤erent under a precise and
general rules and under innovating or quite stable environnement. If the probability of
obsolescence is quite high (precise rule), the lawmaker should enact the law when the
value of the legal content reach a higher level in comparison with the lower probability
of obsolescence case (general rule). We also observe that the value of the waiting option
is always higher for precise rule than general ones. It comes directly from the fact the
condition which tells that the risk free rate r has to remain constant. Higher risk have to
be compensated by higher benets.
Until now, we assumed that the sunk cost I to implement the rule is equal for all types
of legal rules. In practice however, this cost is generally higher for precise legal rule :
IS  IR
We can easily determine the e¤ects of di¤erences in costs using the same parametriza-
tion as before:
I  1 S
 A
1 0:7 6:603 1:178 0:060
1:1 0:7 6:603 1:296 0:035
Table 2 r =  = 0; 04 ,  = 1, and  = 0; 2:
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SF(S)
S-IR
S-IS
S*RS*S
Figure 4: Threshold values for a standard SS (I = 1) and a rule S

R (I = 1:1), with
r =  = 0:04, K = 1,  = 0:2
Figure 2 shows that S28 is negatively a¤ected by the investment cost. Net benets are
also a¤ected; S  IR < S  IS . Consequently, S is higher if enforcement costs are higher.
To sum up, the threshold value for a precise rule is higher due to (1) a higher risk
of obsolescence and (2) higher enforcement costs. The reason is that a standard is less
costly to enact rapidly. Concerning the waiting option values, the comparison is more
ambiguous. The conclusion will depend on the relative importance of enforcement costs
and on the obsolescence intensity. The higher the obsolescence, the higher is the value to
wait. The higher the cost of enforcement, the lower the value.
5 Conclusion
The use of the real options theory appears to be relevant as a guide for legal policies
making.
From an theoretical point of view, lawmakers deal with constraints which are well
28Recall that
P  =
1
1   1
:I
So that
@P (I)
@I
=
1
1   1
> 0
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captured by real options : uncertainty over the future services of legal rules, sunk costs of
promulgation, and di¤erent types of exibility in lawmaking and in the design of law.
We show that the precision of law can be justied: when the legal eld is not subject
to regular changes, the value of precise statement is justied. Complexity arises when
laws have to be frequently modied due to innovation in the eld. In this case, general
statement should be preferred.
More generally, our paper tries to understand how a legal system copes with incom-
pleteness of law, and to deal with the trade-o¤ between potential gaps and ambiguous
terms in law. It explores the aptitude of real options theory to look at characteristics
of legal rules, to appreciate legal exibility. The interaction between exibility and the
value of waiting in lawmaking is analyzed. Therefore, our framework wish to improving
the conditions of public intervention regarding the drafting of legal rules. The approach
allows to get a better picture of how legal rules deal with the issue of obsolescence. This
framework is particularly well adapted to this question as it captures uncertainty inherent
to economic life and, thus, the evolution of the value of services yielded by a legal rule.
From an empirical point of view, our paper calls for an evaluation of legal rules. This
fundamental question, when resources are scarce, appears to be a current major concern.
For instance, reports by the European Commission for the E¢ ciency of Justice (European
Judicial Systems, 2006) and by the World Bank (Reports Doing Business) aim at collecting
data on the organization of legal systems that could help to measure the value of legal
rules and to apply real options approach.
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6 APPENDIX
6.1 Estimation of a call option on the maximum of two legal contents
The value of a European option on the minimum of two assets M(S1; S2; F; t) is dened
as
M(S1; S2;K; t) = S1N2(d¯ 1
) + S2N2(d¯ 2
) K exp( rt)N2(d¯ 3)
with,
d1 = [1 + S2
p
t;
log(S1S2 )  122t

p
t
;
S1;S2S2   S2

]
d2 = [2 + S1
p
t;
log(S2S1 )  122t

p
t
;
S1S2S2   S1

]
d3 = [1; 2; S1;S2 ]
and ,
2 = 2S1 + 
2
S2   2S1;S2  S1  S2
1 =
log(S2S1 ) + (r   122S2)t
S2
p
t
2 =
log(S1S2 ) + (r   122S1)t
S1
p
t
Assume that a couple of variables (a; b) follows a standardized bivariate normal dis-
tribution. N2(d¯
) = M(a; b; ) is the cumulative probability of this standardized bivariate
normal distribution, with  the coe¢ cient of correlation between the two variables: it is
the probability that the rst variable is less than a and the second variable is less than b.
After having substituted S1 and S2 by their numerical values in (??), we get:
2 = 0:09
Therefore, 1 and 2 can be easily calculated by substituting r and T in (??) and (??)
(in our case, 1 = 2):
1 = 0:183 
p
10
= 2
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Thus we get the threshold values d1; d2 and d3:
d1 = [0:483 
p
10; 0:474; 0:5]
d2 = [0:483 
p
10; 0:474; 0:5]
d3 = [0:579; 0:579; 0:5]
Thus, the algorithm of Drezner (see for instance Hull, 2000) is applied to estimate the
value of the cumulative probability in a standardized distribution for d1, d2 and d3.
We found that:
N2(d3) = 0:606
N2(d1) = 0:272
N2(d2) = 0:272
By substituting S1, S2, K, r, T by their numerical values and N2(d¯ 1
), N2(d¯ 2
) and
N2(d¯ 3
) by their approximation in Stulz formula(??), we get:
M(S1; S2;K; t) = 12:87
6.2 Proof of the decision rule
Initial values of S1 and S2 are equal. Consequently, we obtain:
C(S1; F; t) = C(S2; F; t) = C(Si; F; t), with i = 1; 2
Thus, the expression MX(S1; S2; F; t)  C(Si; F; t) can be rewritten as (by assumption,
 > 0):
(2   1)

C(Si; F; t) M(S1; S2F; t)
If  < 12 , then
(2 1)
 C(Si; F; t)  M(S1; S2F; t) < 0. If  = 1, then (2 1) C(Si; F; t)  
M(S1; S2; F; t) > 0. As options values C and M are not function of , the function
f() = (2 1) C(Si; F; t) M(S1; S2; F; t) is continuous and strictly increasing in  on the
interval ]0; 1[ as:
@f()
@
=
1
2
C(Si; F; t) > 0 8 2]0; 1[
Due to a simple intermediate value argument, there exists a unique threshold value  such
that: a rule is preferred if  is lower than . Otherwise, a standard is preferred.
Therefore, the unique threshold value  such that MX(S1; S2; F; t) equals C(Si; F; t)
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is dened by:
 =
C(Si; F; t)
MX(S1; S2; F; t)
6.3 Valuation of waiting to enact
In the continuation region, the Bellman equation can be re-written as:
rF (P; t) = E[dF ] (7)
That is, over a time interval dt, the total expected return on the creation of law oppor-
tunity rF (P ) is equal to the expected benets growth rate. Suppose that P follows the
process of equation (4), and consider a function F (P; t) that is at least twice di¤erentiable
in P . We expand dF using Itos Lemma:
dF = fPFP + 
2
2
P 2FPP + [F ((1  )P )  F (P )]gdt+ PFPdz
+[F ((1  )P )  F (P )](dN   dt)
With E(dz) = 0 and E(dN) = dt, we get:
E(dF ) = (  )PFPdt+ 
2
2
P 2FPPdt+ F ((1  )P )dt  F (P )dt
(  )PFPdt+ 
2
2
P 2FPPdt+ F ((1  )P )dt  F (P )dt  rFdt = 0
Hence, equation (??) can be rewritten as:
2
2
P 2FPP + PFP + F ((1  )P )  (r + )F = 0 (8)
r =  +    , 0    r and  > 0:The solution must also follows three boundary
conditions.
F (0) = 0 (9)
F (P ) = P    I (10)
F 0(P ) = 1 (11)
The rst condition (9)is that if P = 0, then from the mixed Brownian jump process (4),
we know that P will never be positive. Consequently, the value to wait is nil and the value
of invest immediately negative. (9) refers to the case where there is no policy purpose.
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At the value matching condition (10) P , lawmakers are indi¤erent between waiting and
enacting the law. The smooth pastingcondition (11) comes from the continuity property
of the benets evolution. This condition is implied by (11). The option value has to be
continuous, such that the legislator can create law at any moment, and particularly at P .
Thus, the curve of the option value F (P ) has to be tangent to P   I at P .The solution
is of the form:
F (P ) = A:P 1 (12)
with 1the positive solution of (with r    =   ):
1
2
2(   1) + (r +   )   (r + ) + (1  ) = 0 with  > 0 (13)
If  = 1, the positive solution of (13) is:
1 =
1
2
  (r +   )
2
+
r
(
r +   
2
  1
2
)2 + 2
(r + )
2
Thus,
S =
1
1   1
K
and,
A =
S  K
(S)1
=
(1   1)1 1
(1)
1K1
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